Our theories of soldier motivation have largely overlooked the role that coercion plays in manufacturing and maintaining unit cohesion. Yet nearly 20% of all belligerents in wars since 1800 have deployed specialized units designed to monitor and sanction their own soldiers violently. Despite the widespread nature of these "blocking detachments," however, we have neither a systematic treatment of their tactical and operational effects nor of the tradeoffs associated with their battlefield use. This paper draws on new crossnational data and a case study of Soviet practices at Stalingrad and Kursk to explore four tradeoffs stemming from the use of blocking detachments. In brief, these detachments can bolster a military's staying power, but at the cost of sharply increasing casualties and worsening loss-exchange ratios. In keeping with the volume's intent, the paper concludes with a broader discussion of these tradeoffs at the war-fighting and political levels before proposing additional avenues of research on coercion and soldier motivation.
It takes a very brave man to be a coward in the Red Army.

Marshall Georgi Zhukov
The Islamic State's (ISIS) rapid march through northern Iraq during summer 2014 caught most observers by surprise. Its ability to recruit locally and internationally, along with its substantial combat power, prompted an American return to Iraq in the form of a sustained air campaign. Much less attention, however, has been cast on ISIS's mechanisms for maintaining discipline within its own ranks, especially after its momentum was halted around Kobane during winter 2014. ISIS, like many combatants before it, created special units dedicated to enforcing unit cohesion-in particular, by using the threat of violent sanction-to reduce the odds of desertion and defection and to tamp down factionalism arising from the ethnically mixed nature of its forces. These ISIS units have executed hundreds of soldiers caught deserting or defecting; have arrested hundreds more, often along with their families; and have positioned themselves on the battlefield specifically to catch foreign fighters seeking to escape via Turkey or to defect to rival militant organizations.
As one soldier noted, "ISIS wants to kill everyone who says, 'no' [to it]. Everyone must be with them. If you turn against ISIS, they will kill you." 1 Our existing theories of soldier motivation, as well as leading historical accounts of key wars, typically dismiss the use of coercion as ineffective, amoral, and confined to a handful of "deviant" combatants. Yet so-called "blocking detachments" like those used by ISIS have a long history in warfare; indeed, as detailed below, nearly 20% of all belligerents in post-1800 wars have deployed "blocking," "barrier," or "anti-retreat" formations. These units participated in some of the most important wars of the past two hundred years, including the Napoleonic War, the Taiping and Nien rebellions in China, World War One, the Russian Civil War, and the Warlord Era in China (1916-28) . Perhaps most well-known 1 is the use of blocking detachments (zagraditel'nye otriady) by the Red Army during the Second World War. Over 158,000 Soviet soldiers would die at the hands of their own comrades in 1941-44 (???) .
Blocking detachments also offer a window into the notion that tradeoffs exist across different facets of military effectiveness at the war-fighting level. While earlier conceptual frameworks do acknowledge the possibility of tradeoffs across and within levels of analysis (?), most current theorizing instead tends to focus on discrete "building blocks" of military effectiveness. As Dan Reiter acknowledges in this volume's introduction, this emphasis on narrow aspects of military effectiveness, however important these elements individually, tends to obscure tough decisions by combatants about which aspects of military effectiveness to privilege and which to sacrifice in pursuit of broader political aims. Put differently, military effectiveness is a spectrum of tasks, and proficiency in one area may come at the expense of another. At least for some belligerents, not all good things go together (Lyall 2015) .
These units impose a central tradeoff: coercion can artificially bolster a military's staying power -that is, its cohesion and resolve once battlefield fortunes turn against it -but at the cost of increased casualties and new vulnerabilities that can worsen its loss-exchange ratio in combat. This tradeoff manifests itself across several dimensions of military effectiveness. Blocking detachments can forestall (further) desertion and defection, for example, but using violence against one's own soldiers obviously contributes to the butcher's bill of casualties. Their presence can strengthen command and control (C2) over wayward soldiers and their officers. In doing so, however, they also generate incentives to rely on rigid tactics and operations that increase vulnerability to enemy fire, again increasing losses. These detachments can bolster soldier resolve through the threat of punishment, but soldier grievances will also mount, worsening morale and possibly spilling over into greater insubordination, including officer executions ("fragging").
In keeping with this volume's themes, I explore the tradeoffs inherent in blocking detachments at the war-fighting level. I first provide descriptive statistics and context on the historical use of blocking detachments using a new dataset of 250 conventional wars (1800-2011). I then outline four possible tradeoffs in their battlefield deployment before drawing on Soviet experiences at Stalingrad (1942-43) and Kursk (1943) to provide an initial plausibility probe using process tracing (?). Next, I consider several additional tradeoffs that emerge from this process tracing before concluding with suggestions for future research on coercion, blocking detachments, and military effectiveness.
Blocking Detachments in History
I define blocking detachments as specialized units designed to monitor and sanction soldiers and their officers within a belligerent's own military during wartime. Monitoring includes surveillance of soldier attitudes using spies or other collection methods (i.e. reviewing and censoring soldier letters) to assess morale. These units often oversee possible retreat avenues to foreclose opportunities for military personnel to desert or defect. As part of this monitoring mission, blocking detachments can act as a barrier between soldiers and rear areas, preventing information exchange while limiting chances for soldiers to escape.
These units also possess the capacity to sanction using the threat or imposition of violence against soldiers and, in some cases, their families. Possible sanction mechanisms include coerced return to units after successful desertion, forced enrollment in penal battalions, and even execution, oftentimes in front of a soldier's own unit.
Blocking detachments are typically stationed in the immediate rear of deployed forces to guard against unauthorized withdrawal and to prod soldiers into action when attacking.
These units do not typically engage enemy forces, instead saving their fire for their own forces. In this definition, blocking units are officially authorized rather than ad hoc arrangements, though they may owe their origins to informal practices adopted haphazardly by frontline units. While exceptions do exist, 2 these units are usually staffed by personnel chosen for their presumed regime loyalty. Their diversion from frontline roles thus represents a costly investment since these hardline supporters are often the most effective units available to political leaders. 4 These data indicate that leaders were equally likely to resort to blocking detachments across the "pre-modern" (1800-1917) and post-World War I "modern" (1918-) eras of warfare (??), suggesting that these units are not simply a response to the increased lethality of modern warfare. Nor are these units confined to the same set of combatants.
While some countries have relied heavily on such practices (notably, Russia and China), a full 22% of all combatants in the dataset recorded at least one deployment of blocking detachments in the pre-World War I era (28/125). A similar 18% of combatants in the post-World War I era (19/103) did so as well.
Several trends emerge from these data. Above all, the deployment of blocking detachments is strongly associated with a regime's prewar repression of ethnic groups within its national borders. As Lyall (2015) would, but at the cost of creating new grievances, including the opening of a second front between officers and soldiers and soldiers and their blocking detachments. These tradeoffs are summarized in Table 1 .
Before exploring these tradeoffs in greater detail below, it is worth noting that assessments of tradeoffs hinge on identifying the appropriate comparison group. We can identify tradeoffs in two ways: (1) the belligerent's own battlefield performance during a given war, where we can identify the positive and negative effects of blocking detachment within the same military across different facets that comprise military effectiveness (a "withincase" comparison); and (2) the comparison to a similar belligerent that did not deploy blocking detachments (a "paired-case" comparison). This second comparison is helpful in establishing the counterfactual (??): that is, how much worse (or better) would the state's battlefield performance have been had it not used blocking detachments? I use both types of comparison below. 
Cohesion versus Casualties
Blocking units represent an institutional response to the twin threats of desertion and defection that have plagued armies for centuries, particularly those armies that find themselves suffering high casualty rates at the war's outset. Desertion is defined as the unauthorized wartime withdrawal of a unit (or group of soldiers) from the battlefield or its rear areas with the intention of permanently abandoning the fight. Withdrawing from the war effort can take two forms: hiding from state authorities among the civilian population in an attempt to return to a prewar life; or resorting to brigandage in rear areas without coordinating with enemy forces (?). Defection, by contrast, is defined as the transfer of allegiance to the opposing side with the intention of taking up arms against one's former government.
If successful, blocking units may significantly reduce manpower drain-perhaps eliminating desertion and defection entirely-while also preventing the transfer of weapons and intelligence to one's opponent. Stemming this loss of manpower also has downstream benefits: preventing desertion undercuts the formation of brigandage units by deserters that prey upon logistical lines or local populations for food, weapons, and money. During the First World War, the Ottoman Army, for example, experienced massive desertion from its Greek, Armenian, and Arab soldiers who, in turn, formed groups that attacked railway lines to pilfer supplies, hobbling Ottoman logistics (?, 270-72) .
Similarly, blocking detachments not only restore a military's manpower but also prevent large groups of disgruntled, armed, soldiers from heading home with the intent of toppling the regime itself. Shaky regimes may turn to blocking detachments as a battlefield form of "coup-proofing" that minimizes the chances that military indiscipline and desertion could become existential challenges to regime survival. There is a now-extensive literature on coup-proofing, particularly in Arab authoritarian states, where leaders take deliberate action -including circumscribed training, prohibitions on live-fire exercises, recruitment and promotion that favors certain (loyal) groups over merit -to reduce coup threat. These actions invariably trade regime security for military effectiveness, however (????), And while the impetus behind the deployment of blocking detachments is to improve staying power, and the odds of eventual victory, by sealing soldiers in place, it is undeniable that these measures can have spillover effects that contribute to regime security.
This externally-imposed discipline comes with a marked downside, of course. In many cases, these units can inflict tremendous casualties on their own forces. Santiago Marino, a key leader of the (Second) Republic of Venezuela during its war of independence (1812-14), resorted to executing every fifth deserter caught by his special disciplinary formations.
Given the small size of his army (less than 5,000 soldiers at some points), the effect was There is also a hidden side to these casualties. Anecdotally, we often observe the rise of self-inflicted mutilation and maiming by soldiers desperate to escape both the battlefield and the wrath of blocking units. These behaviors reduce the available pool of recruits and, equally as important, contribute to the erosion of morale among remaining soldiers. Given these attempts at evasion, it is unsurprising that some blocking detachments, including those employed by the Soviet Union, had specific orders to comb field hospitals for soldiers suspected of deliberately harming themselves (?, 330fn59).
The creation and staffing of these units can also represent a sizable diversion of resources away from the battlefield. Imperial China and the Soviet Union each supported their blocking detachments with substantial bureaucracies, rear prison camps, and extensive surveillance efforts that demanded tens of thousands of soldiers. Moreover, these units are typically drawn from the most competent (and loyal) personnel: pulling them from the front-lines to rear overwatch positions is a gamble that may not pay dividends. Nor is maintaining the loyalty of these units automatic; in many cases, militaries have devised special incentives to motivate these soldiers that undercut overall military effectiveness.
Loyalty-inducing policies can range from higher pay and preferential access to food and weapons to sanctioned battlefield looting, as is the case with President Bashar al-Assad's quasi-blocking force, the National Defense Forces.
Militaries adopting blocking detachments are essentially gambling that they can generate a credible deterrent to desertion and defection without inflicting sufficient casualties to sabotage the entire war effort. The exact location of this tradeoff is an empirical question, one that depends on the detachment's size, its lethality, the extent of its bureaucratic apparatus, and the salience of the underlying grievances leading soldiers to challenge authority. That said, the tradeoff between cohesion and casualties is a basic feature of blocking detachments, one that all militaries employing such units will inevitably face on the battlefield.
Control versus Flexibility
Blocking detachments can improve command and control (C2) in two ways. Tighter control can be exercised over officers if these units have the authority to punish them for failure. In turn, officers can use the presence of these units to threaten their soldiers with punishment, reinforcing their own codentrol over the rank-and-file. Together, these pressures on soldiers and their commanders can improve battlefield C2, particularly when battlefield losses are piling up and when senior military commanders suspect disloyalty among their officers or soldiers. The result is a more unified effort within and across units while also increasing the odds that orders will be carried out, improving battlefield performance somewhat when compared to a baseline of total C2 breakdown. Improved C2 also reduces the likelihood of a successful officer-led challenge, adding another layer of battlefield coup-proofing. Tighter control in turn restores some options at the operational level, at least compared to militaries facing disintegration. Blocking detachments may reopen avenues of action previously ruled out by the threat of (further) desertion. These stop-gap measures, however inefficient, permit a combatant to launch operations that states in similar situations but without blocking detachments could not undertake. In fact, the threat of sanction exhorts units to prosecute riskier and costlier operations than otherwise possible, perhaps gaining a significant edge over adversaries that cannot muster similar efforts. Blocking units can, for example, drive near-suicidal frontal attacks that can swamp an enemy's defenses. Pushed past their natural breaking points, these units become key assets in an attritional struggle to grind a superior opponent down.
Reliance on these blocking detachments does reduce battlefield flexibility, however.
In particular, these units can impose sometimes severe restrictions on the tactics and operational practices of fielded armies. Since blocking detachments substitute coercion for soldier initiative, militaries will often simplify their tactics and operations to limit their complexity for soldiers who are poorly motivated and trained (see below). Frontal assaults are a hallmark of forces with blocking detachments since they concentrate manpower at a fixed point, reducing the need for complicated coordination while allowing advancing units to remain tethered to their minders.
The need to maintain close physical proximity to blocking detachments also undercuts the ability of attacking armies to seize opportunities, especially during exploitation operations after breaking through enemy positions. Tactics and operational art will also innovate at a slower pace since many battlefield problems can be "solved" simply by throwing more soldiers into the fray, a luxury that armies not backstopped by these detachments might not be able to consider. These conservative tactics and operations are rational from the commander's point of view: they offer less risk of failure than bold but unproven operations. Better to muddle through and "only" lose men than risk personal sanction for abandoning orthodox battlefield practices.
Rigid command and control, along with simplified tactics and an unwillingness to rely upon individual soldier initiative, is a recipe for increased casualties, however. Conservative tactics and the need to advance at the pace of blocking detachments create new vulnerabilities that enemies can exploit to inflict greater casualties than otherwise possible. These same vulnerabilities also limit the amount of damage done to an enemy; blocking detachments may slow rates of advancement, for example, providing scattered enemy forces time to regroup and escape encirclement. By slowing rates of innovation, blocking detachments impose constraints on killing proficiency, forcing belligerents to miss out on the early adoption of alternative tactics or operations that might improve loss-exchange ratios.
The presence of blocking detachments also introduces a specific form of C2 vulnerability.
If these units are required to maintain military cohesion, then they become high priority targets. Given their distinctive profile on the battlefield, these units are perhaps uniquely vulnerable to counter-C2 efforts. This is especially true in the modern era of warfare; these units can be found, fixed, and targeted by aircraft, drones, and electronic warfare to degrade their capabilities. Cracking these disciplinary units could in turn create new opportunities for desertion and defection from previously bottled up soldiers, leading to the unraveling of whole formations if not the entire fielded force.
Reduced Training versus Lower Skill
Another States may lack the resources to devote to realistic training. They may also fear the consequences of diffusing prewar weapons training throughout their population given suspected disloyalties. Once war begins, states may lack the time to provide realistic training, especially if battlefield casualties are heavy. In these situations, states need to mobilize large numbers of soldiers quickly and have them make an immediate impact, even if they are unskilled. Blocking detachments provide one solution: coercion allows states to shortchange training, sacrificing quality for quantity and using threatened violence rather than socialization as the glue holding units together. This solution provides a framework for action that does not hinge on a high level of skill or training but that generates combat power quickly, if crudely, a kind of exoskeleton for low-skill soldiers.
In fact, by halting widespread desertion or panic, blocking detachments can actually buy time for more sustained training over the medium-to-long term. The presence of these units will also improve killing proficiency by forcing soldiers to overcome their reluctance to fire their weapons. This is especially true in the pre-World War One era, where the absence of rigorous (prewar) training meant that soldiers still had a strong aversion to killing (?).
Units with blocking detachments will be more proficient-as measured by volume of firethan comparable units without blocking units, though perhaps not as effective as units that never needed these detachments in the first place.
Of course, the substitution of coercion for sustained training imposes costs. Armies with blocking detachments will muster and deploy soldiers with lower-than-average skills relative to their non-blocked opponents. Tactical skills are an important, if often overlooked, aspect of military effectiveness: they help soldiers maximize their use of terrain, reducing their exposure to enemy fire while maximizing their ability to inflict casualties (?). Weak skills translate into reduced tactical proficiency, imposing constraints not only on basic tactics but also the ability to carry out complicated operations that require a high degree of coordination. Unskilled soldiers will also have reduced means to seize sudden battlefield opportunities or to improvise within their commanders' guidelines in order to stay alive and inflict casualties.
The result is again a ballooning of the costs incurred by combatants utilizing blocking detachments: casualties will be higher than non-blocked armies and loss-exchange ratios far worse as less skilled soldiers fare worse on the battlefield, reducing their ability to inflict casualties even as their own losses mount. Reduced firearm proficiency will also result in a decreased ability to kill enemy soldiers, resulting in worsened loss-exchange ratios. Reduced opportunities to acquire skills also extends to more prosaic issues such as maintenance: without these skills, armies risk the interruption of their operations due to logistical delays in repairing and resupplying materiel.
Resolve Versus Grievance
Perhaps the most intuitive reason for using blocking detachments is that coercion can increase soldier resolve, especially among units with poor morale and indiscipline but that have not (yet) committed mass desertion or defection. By foreclosing the ability to retreat, blocking units may force soldiers to fight harder and to absorb higher casualties than they otherwise might have if left to their own devices. These units can be especially valuable when enforcing discipline and order among soldiers who view the state as illegitimate or are in danger of breaking from heavy battlefield casualties. In these instances, blocking units represent a last-ditch effort to force soldiers to fight, avoid costly retreats, and to buy time for reinforcements to arrive. desertion and the probability of winning the war (Rosen 2005, 125 ).
Yet while coercion can induce resolve mechanically, its use only creates further grievances among soldiers and officers. If soldiers were reluctant to fight on behalf of the regime before, threatened violence is unlikely to generate genuine pro-regime sentiment. Instead, the use of blocking detachments will be treated as an credible signal that the regime believes its soldiers are unreliable, and that they will exercise less initiative (unless organizing desertion) and less resolve if left unguarded. These grievances may lead to catastrophic spirals of desertion and defection if a unit is separated from its blocking detachment during battle, especially if soldiers were from targeted groups that had experienced violence or discrimination at the hands of the regime in the prewar era. Blocking detachments can reinforce rather than suppress existing ethnic and other fault-lines within these units if their punishment is applied unevenly. In turn, these grievances may be exploited by opponents'
propaganda that calls attention to the graphic nature of the regime's own devaluation of their lives.
More generally, grievance formation can spark an intra-military "second front" pitting soldiers against their officers and units against their blocking detachments. The creation and deployment of blocking units can drive a wedge between officers and soldiers by setting up dueling incentive structures. Officers will be punished by blocking detachments for not pushing their soldiers forward, creating incentives to use them callously to avoid their own execution or cashiering for poor performance. Soldiers will naturally resent these operations and are liable to strike back by "fragging" officers. Bonds of trust between officers and their soldiers will also crumble, hobbling coordination and strategy. At its extreme, this resentment may push soldiers to organize collective action against the blocking detachments themselves, either by purposely attempting to separate during battle or even by turning their weapons against them. What do we lack? There is no order and discipline in companies, battalions, regiments, in tank units and air squadrons. This is our main deficiency. We should establish in our army the most stringent order and solid discipline, if we want to salvage the situation, and to keep our Motherland. . . Panic-mongers and cowards should be wiped out on the spot.
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The adoption of these blocking detachments was not due solely to battlefield losses, however. Stalin and his Soviet High Command (Stavka) faced a deeper structural problem: allegiance to the regime was highly variable among soldiers, particularly those drawn from ethnic groups that had suffered from repressive prewar Soviet nation-building and collectivization drives. These soldiers had little desire to fight for a regime that had victimized their families, helping to explain why desertion and defection was so high among Soviet forces during 1941-42. In addition, many of these soldiers, especially Ukrainians and Belorussians, had homes in now-German occupied territories, creating both motive and opportunity for soldiers to slip away from the ranks. Many Soviet commanders viewed their own soldiers with suspicion, accusing them of divided loyalties and an unwillingness to bear the necessary costs to protect the Soviet regime. Nor could commanders rely on primary group bonds to instill discipline and maintain cohesion: by one estimate, loss rates were so high during these initial years that the average front-line tour for an infantryman before death or serious wounding was only three weeks (?, 16 ).
Yet reliable information about these detachments, despite their well-known role, remains difficult to obtain, in part because of prior censorship and current sensitives; Order No.227 itself was not publicly released until 1988. Most scholarly treatments of the Eastern Front typically marginalize the effects of these units, pausing only to highlight their shocking nature before returning to blow-by-blow accounts of various battles. In fact, the best accounts of these units are actually found in Soviet-and post-Soviet literature. Russian historians have questioned the very existence of most of these units, suggesting that their role has been exaggerated by Western historians seeking to denigrate Soviet contributions in Nazi Germany's defeat (degeroisatziya).
14 Other historians have argued that executions were so infrequently and haphazardly carried out that they did not serve as a credible deterrent. "Soldiers may have been afraid," Roger Reese has argued, but "that does not explain the compliance of the majority of the army (?, 173).
Others assign a much more prominent role to these units, however. "All soldiers shared some measure of fear," Catherine Merridale has written, and "the NKVD soldier with his pistol, shooting stragglers in the back, is an abiding image of this war" (?, 317).
Alexander Statiev has reached a similar finding, noting the "nearly unanimous opinion of played "a major role in increasing the resilience and military activity of Soviet forces [and] in creating a turning point in the course of military operations" (?, 330). represented the first time that Soviet forces had encircled and destroyed a German Army.
The Cases: Stalingrad and Kursk
The cost was high for both sides, as the battle degenerated into brutal house-to-house fighting within Stalingrad's shattered environs. Soviet forces lost an estimated 1,129,619
casualties; Nazi forces, about 850,000 soldiers killed, wounded, or captured. Soviet materiel losses were also enormous: some 4,341 tanks, 15,728 artillery pieces, and 2,769 aircraft were destroyed; the Nazis lost 500 tanks, 6,000 artillery pieces, and 900 aircraft. Soviet soldiers were killed, wounded, captured, or missing, while over 6,000 tanks and assault guns were destroyed or rendered non-operational; Axis forces lost 252,182 soldiers, along with 760 tanks and assault guns.
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Space constraints do not permit a full examination of these battles, each of which has its own (vast) dedicated literature. Taken together, however, these battles offer a plausibility probe of the tradeoffs associated with blocking detachments in various phases of modern, high-intensity, warfare. Blocking detachments were partially deployed at Stalingrad, for example, but had proliferated to nearly every unit at Kursk. Soviet forces were both on the defensive and offensive in these battles, and in each case transitioned from defensive 15 Estimates are from ?, 107-09,221-22. 16 Estimates are from ?, 123-24,228. positions to counteroffensives, permitting investigation of blocking detachments during various campaign phases. And we also observe the use of these units during different types of combat, ranging from the close quarters, block-to-block fighting of Stalingrad to mobile operations, including some of the largest combined arms operations ever undertaken.
Cohesion versus casualties
The battles at Stalingrad and Kursk illustrate perhaps the greatest asset of blocking de- 
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The blocking detachments exacted a heavy price, though, in terms of increasing Soviet casualties. Red Army detachments and their NKVD counterparts executed an estimated 158,000 of their own soldiers (?, 157). While these executions represented "only" 3% of the total number of soldiers detained, these losses in an absolute sense were enormous, representing at least eleven full-strength Soviet divisions. Some 13,500 soldiers alone were shot at Stalingrad within the space of two weeks (?, 157). Put differently, these casualties rivaled total US Army losses in the European and Atlantic theaters (185,924) and dwarfed those suffered in the Pacific campaign (106,207) (?). An additional 450,000 soldiers were captured by blocking detachments and reassigned to penal battalions. These units conducted high-risk missions such as route clearance for Soviet offensives in exchange for reduced criminal sentences; casualties were staggering, often reaching 50% or greater of unit strength in just one operation (?, 577). In short, blocking detachments reduced cohesion problems but did so at the direct cost of massive casualties.
18 "Direktiva voennogo soveta Tsentral'nogo fronta no.027 ot 18.4.43 g," quoted in ?, 578.
Control versus Flexibility
Blocking detachments also enabled Soviet commanders to maintain a degree of control over their soldiers likely not possible in their absence. We can observe their effects in two ways.
First, Stavka, fearful that its commanders had grown overly cautious after the defeats of 1941, viewed these units as mechanisms that prevented premature withdrawal by commanders paralyzed by the threat of encirclement. As such, blocking detachments removed an element of discretion from the commander's purview by foreclosing any unauthorized retreats and by emphasizing offensive action (?, 97).
Second, these units could enforce control over regular units that were suffering catastrophic losses, whether as part of an attritional defense-in-depth strategy or offensive operations. At Kursk, losses among frontline Soviet divisions ranged from a low of 20% to as high as 70%, casualty rates likely unsustainable in most, if not all, armies (?, 275).
The 52nd Guards Division, for example, was virtually annihilated in the first few days of the German offensive at Kursk, its soldiers sacrificed in an attritional effort to limit the depth of German penetration. Similarly, the threat of coercion pushed soldiers forward to seize the momentum from stalled German attacks even when units were seriously depleted.
Soviet casualties spiked three-fold, from 7,000 on 11 July to 20,000 soldiers on 12 July 1943, when the Soviet pivoted from the defensive to offensive at Kursk, yet continued to push forward.
Reliance on blocking detachments to maintain control translated into reduced battlefield flexibility and thus indirectly contributed to higher casualties, however. Despite improvements over time, Soviet tactics and operational art remained fairly simple, if not crude, for much of the war. This is true of both Stalingrad and Kursk, where even the most innovative commanders -often in armor units -continued to rely on frontal assaults and basic maneuvers rather than more complicated operational art such as mobile defense or double envelopment. As Glantz acknowledged, the stereotype of the Red Army as a "monolithic and rigid force the employed artless steamroller tactics to achieve victory regardless of cost" was largely correct. The Red Army sought to absorb German offensives and then shift to the attack once their momentum had been halted, moving "in painstakingly rigid fashion while on the offense, often artlessly and regardless of cost" (?, 618).
Blocking detachments conspired to narrow battlefield flexibility by design: to remain a credible deterrent, these units needed to be tethered to regular line units. As a result, Soviet commanders embraced simplified, rigid, tactics that assumed military cohesion would suffer if a gap emerged from regular units and their minders. The need to preserve this linkage created incentives to rely on costly frontal assaults where blocking detachments could maintain near constant surveillance. Similarly, exploitation efforts were curbed for fear that attacking units might become separated from their blocking detachments.
Moreover, the fact that blocking detachments could punish officers created reinforcing incentives to rely on tried-and-true, if costly, tactics and operations and to eschew more innovative but riskier approaches that might save lives. Fearing cashiering if seen as insufficiently aggressive, commanders launched many mistimed offensives that stalled out in part because they felt pressured to take action even if their men and materiel were depleted.
In short, blocking detachments restored some measure of control over units and their Soviet coercion allowed German forces to punish the Red Army heavily for its inflexibility, inflicting casualties at a rate above the baseline expectation of losses had these units not been necessary.
Training versus skill
Order No.227 and the threat of sanction from blocking detachments also permitted Soviet commanders to create new units at a breakneck pace. Coercion became a substitute for realistic training; raw recruits often received as little as two weeks training before their assignment to the front (?, 138). In some cases, civilians were actually shanghaied into service, while whole units were thrown together from remnants of shattered units. Under such conditions, lasting primary group bonds were unlikely to form, creating units with potential discipline problems, low initiative, and unskilled soldiers. Blocking detachments thus 
Resolve versus grievance
By foreclosing most opportunities for soldiers to abandon their units, blocking detachments improved overall resolve, if only in a negative sense. Widespread panics were reduced once Perhaps more telling, however, is the tinge of desperation and gallows humor that accompanied front line soldiers accounts of their own resolve. As one popular song recounted:
The first shell punctured my gas tank. I jumped out of the tank -how I do not know. So they called me over to the special section [the blocking detachment]: "Why didn't you burn up with your tank, you son of a bitch?!" So I answered, and this is what I said: "I'll be sure to do that the next time we attack."
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Still, inducing resolve via coercion created its own problems. Even as late as Kursk, soldiers attempted evasion if blocking units failed to seal possible escape routes. Soldiers quickly came to resent their presence, speaking openly of a "Second Front" being organized against them.
22 The NKVD, which monitored soldier attitudes closely using a vast network of informers, was alarmed by the possibility that "hostile elements" might exploit the creation of blocking units to induce Soviet soldiers to desert or defect. of these punishments; in many cases, innocent soldiers were prosecuted or killed. Soldiers sometimes resorted to killing ("fragging") their own officers, creating a potential crisis for command -and-control (?, 192) .
Discussion
As the Soviet experience demonstrates, blocking detachments can play a critical role in maintaining unit cohesion under punishing conditions. This battlefield staying power came at tremendous cost, however. Indeed, the combination of executions, officer fragging, soldier mutilation, and reduced tactical and operational flexibility induced by these units produced far more Soviet casualties and a poorer loss-exchange ratio than otherwise expected by strict calculations of efficiency (?).
The Red Army's use of blocking detachments also highlights several additional tradeoffs.
The presence of these units likely contributed to the barbarization of warfare on the Eastern Front, for example.
25 To be sure, both Hitler and Stalin refused to adhere to existing agreements governing the treatment of prisoners of war. As Timothy Snyder points out, the first concentration camps to appear on the Eastern Front were designed specifically to hold Soviet prisoners of war captured during the encirclement battles of 1941 (?, 175-79 ).
Yet while Hitler worked feverishly to dismantle incentives for individual Soviet soldiers to consider surrender, Soviet blocking detachments did so from the rear, creating a killor-be-killed environment in which Soviet soldiers sought revenge upon captured Germans.
The combination of Nazi and Soviet policies created a setting where neither surrender nor retreat were viable options for most Soviet soldiers, contributing to battles where quarter was neither given nor accepted. The result was a savage reciprocity where Soviet and Nazi
POWs faced staggering mortality rates and where scores of soldiers (on both sides) were summarily executed while trying to surrender (?, 220-24) .
In addition, the use of blocking detachments generated political tradeoffs. Red Army and NKVD blocking detachments had an extensive role in policing -or, more aptly, "re- If I should go to shooting men by scores for desertion, I should soon have such a hullabaloo about my ears as I haven't had yet, and I should deserve it. You can't order men shot by dozens or twenties. People won't stand it, and they ought not to stand it. No, we must change the condition of things in some other way.
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Even desperate belligerents suffering from poor cohesion and high desertion rates have delayed adopting blocking detachments out of concern for their political consequences.
The Confederate States of America, for example, was faced with endemic desertion and a corresponding crippling manpower shortage but only belatedly authorized the creation of dedicated forces to hunt down and return deserters in 1863-64 (?, 193-95 Finally, Soviet practices also raise the key issue of whether these cross-cutting warfighting effects scale up to affect war outcomes. Of course, many factors contribute to a state's victory (or defeat), and it can be difficult to isolate the specific effects of any one policy or practice. This is especially the case with blocking detachments, where selection effects concerning the adoption of these units and timing of their implementation are wrapped up in broader war dynamics and belligerent characteristics. Was the belligerent already on the glide path to defeat when these units were created, thereby spuriously associating blocking detachments with defeat? Did these units prolong the collapse of an army or actually hasten its demise? All of these scenarios are plausible, and so we must be cautious in assigning blame and credit to blocking detachments. 
Conclusion
Blocking detachments highlight the often-neglected role that coercion can play in motivating soldiers to fight and maintain discipline even under brutal circumstances. The tradeoffs and costs associated with purchasing battlefield staying power are high, however. These costs range from sharply higher casualties to rigid tactics and constrained operations as well as the creation of grievances among soldiers and a second front between officers and soldiers. Though often relegated to the margins of our theoretical and historical accounts of warfare, the role of blocking detachments, as well as similar institutions such as disciplinary units and state-created paramilitaries, opens new avenues for inquiry into how coercion influences military effectiveness.
Understanding these tradeoffs will require substantial investment in the collection of microlevel data fine-grained enough to parse out wartime dynamics between blocking detachments, coerced soldiers, local populations, and enemy forces. Ideally, our research design would capture situations were only some units were assigned blocking detachments while other similar ones were not, with selection criteria approaching "as-if" random requirements. Time-series data will also become crucial for identifying the effects of these coercive institutions before and after their implementation for a host of battlefield activities, including desertion, defection, and loss-exchange ratios. There is a key role for qualitative evidence and process tracing in these accounts, too, for many of the measures of battlefield performance, including missed opportunities, decreased flexibility, and poor training, are difficult to gauge quantitatively. Similarly, teasing out the relationship between coercion and desertion will require careful tracing of the sequence of events linking the incidence of desertion and the adoption of blocking detachments.
It also remains an open question whether states can "fine-tune" the severity of these tradeoffs. It may be possible, for example, to limit the number of executions, or to deploy blocking detachments to only the worst offenders, without undermining the deterrent value of these forces. States could reduce the combat skills necessary for combined arms by adopting less complicated, but more reliable, equipment, thus keeping the force generation properties of coercion while limiting its downside. Where the exact location of the tradeoff lies will vary across combatants; we should not assume that these tradeoffs are necessarily fixed or that states are helpless captives before them. There may be some room to adjust the severity of these tradeoffs, if only on the margins, for at least some portion of combatants wielding these forces in battle.
The role of coercion in motivating soldiers, and of blocking detachments more specifically, could also be extended to the study of insurgent organizations. Here, too, coercion has largely been neglected in favor of arguments about the relative importance of material incentives, emotional appeals to revenge, and ideological commitment for recruitment and socialization dynamics (????). Yet many insurgencies draw on coercive tactics to recruit, motivate, and foster greater discipline. And while insurgent organizations typically favor hit-and-run strikes rather than direct battle, as they edge closer to conventional warfare we are likely to observe the formation of disciplinary (sub)units.
These tradeoffs may also be altered in the future by the introduction of new technology.
While innovations such as drones have clearly affected the lethality of modern warfare (Horowitz, this volume), these technologies may have an even greater effect on the ability of belligerents to monitor and sanction their own soldiers. Technologies such as aerostats, drones, and biometric identification could all be deployed to mitigate or even eliminate opportunities for desertion and defection. If blocking detachments were aided, or even replaced, by these technologies, their deterrent effects would be bolstered by removing discretion from local commanders and by closing spaces for soldiers to escape detection.
Of course, these C2 systems would also make lucrative targets for opposition forces, either via direct action or electronic means that degrade or destroy these battlefield capabilities.
Perhaps most importantly, blocking detachments and other coercive institutions illustrate the importance of casting military effectiveness as the culmination of multiple tradeoffs. Militaries are rarely proficient across all facets of effectiveness; choices are often necessary about when to maximize performance in some facets of battlefield performance while accepting greater risk and inefficiencies in others. Efforts to maximize performance in certain areas -say, the reduction of threats to cohesion -can have negative, sometimes unanticipated, consequences for other aspects of military performance such as loss-exchange ratios. Studying these tradeoffs, including why and when they occur, will push our theories away from simple building block approaches and towards richer, more nuanced, accounts of military effectiveness.
